- A paper I wrote in fall 2013
International Political Economy of
Foreign Aid
Foreign
aid has become routine among developed countries, used as a political tool to
further interests or attempt to gain policy changes in less developed
countries. Many factors play into the decision making process for giving
foreign aid, and the goals hoped to be achieved also change depending on who is
in power in the donor country. Overall, we must first study why countries give
foreign aid in the first place, focusing on the type of country, its relative
strength in the international structure, and the ideological view of the group in charge of the donor country. Next, seeing whether foreign aid can play
the same role as resource revenues in the budget for recipient governments, examining how the
aid received is similar to resource rents. Next, how economic reform, whether
caused through the politics of foreign aid or not, can lead to political change
in the recipient countries. Lastly, we look at how democratic transitions, occurring as a country moves from autocracy to democracy, can be increase the risk of conflict prone.
Countries
have multiple reasons for giving financial aid to developing countries, and
those reasons vary as situations and the international power system changes.
Not only does it depend on the relative strength of the donor country, but also
the ideological position of the group in charge of giving the money. Policy
goals can include supporting the internal economic development of a recipient
country, getting external reciprocation from the recipient’s government, as
well as promoting domestic businesses by strengthening commercial ties with the
recipient government (Packer Notes 2013). First, looking at whether a donor
country is a major power or minor power in the global power structure is
important in determining what the goals might be. Realist security concerns are
a genuine worry for larger powers and therefore the aid may be in response to
some threats, seeking policy reciprocation from the recipient state.
Conversely, minor powers are much less likely to have realist security concerns
and therefore are more likely to give the aid with the goal of economic
development if the recipient state. However, both large and small powers want
to promote domestic businesses and thereby strengthen commercial ties within
the recipient state. For instance, “Germany might give a recipient money, but
only if they use it to buy German tractors” (Bueno de Mesquita & Smith, 2011). In essence, foreign
aid can be a form of subsidy to Germany manufacturing. Next, the
ideology of the party in power of the donor country factors into the decision
making process of giving foreign aid. On one hand, globalists argue that
instability in a recipient country is driven by an external threat, meaning
some sort of group like jihadists or communists are behind any domestic
instability. Therefore, the donor country, that may feel threatened by those
very same groups, will want to give foreign aid to keep a ‘friendly’ or non
jihadist government in power of the recipient country. This is also known as
external policy reciprocation, foreign aid in exchange for a stable regime that
is friendly to the donor country and will fight the external threat (Packer
Notes 2013). On the other hand, if regionalists are in power, they view
domestic instability of the recipient state driven by internal threats, meaning
there is a need for economic reform or political reform. Therefore, foreign aid
politics may largely be driven by the demand for policy changes to alleviate
those pressures within the government receiving the aid. This promotes
stability. Taking all this into account, there are many factors that play into
the goals and decision making of donor states in regard to giving foreign aid.
Overall, the domestic groups and type of state play an important role in this
process.
Next,
now that it is understood why countries will give foreign aid, one must look at
what role that aid plays fore the recipient country. Specifically, whether the
aid can take the same shape and use as a revenue stream for a government as
resource rents. Resource rents are extracted by governments who are able to
control the resources within a country, say oil for instance. Since the
government controls the oil, it is able to derive large revenues from the
resources; it no longer has much of an incentive to tax its citizens. In this
sense, the revenue stream is coming from an ‘external’ source, the oil, and not
an internal source like the people. The government can get a large enough
revenue stream from the resources to pay off its winning coalition without
needing extra revenue from taxing the citizens. This has serious implications;
first it means that if the government no longer needs to tax its citizens, it
will not feel responsible to public demands of any sort. If the government is
not responsible to the people, the country may experience political decline and
overall less freedoms and protection by the government. Furthermore, a
government will have no incentive to provide public goods for its citizens as
it is receiving no payment in taxation and can probably stay in power through
its winning coalition. This is especially true of a small winning coalition, in
which case money will be spent solely on private goods to keep that winning
coalition happy. Any spending on public projects is money wasted by the
government, as it does not benefit the winning coalition, assuming it is
relatively small, and therefore does not keep the winning coalition satisfied.
In this sense, a steady stream of foreign aid can take act very much in the
same way as resource revenue. The money is coming from an outside source;
therefore there is less of an incentive or need to tax the people, very much
like a government getting its revenue from a resource. This can be especially
true if the aid is coming from globalists, those who are giving the aid in
response to external threats and want to see a ‘friendly’ government in power.
The donor state will not pay much attention to the policies of that government,
so long as they support the donor state in its overall goal of stopping the
threat. Put promptly, “political logic suggests that democratic donors are
ready to turn a blind eye to theft and
corruption when they need a favor” (Bueno
de Mesquita & Smith, 2011). An example of this would be the US giving over
$500 million to the leader of Liberia and in return got support for US policy
towards Libya and Iran during the cold war. Again, the leader, President Doe,
“[gave] far greater priority to short-term political survival… than to any
long-term [economic] recovery… President Doe had great allegiance to his
tribe’s people and inner circle. His support of local groups on ill designed
projects undercut larger social objectives” (Bueno de Mesquita & Smith, 2011). In essence, the leader
used the funds much as a leader would use a revenue stream, on pork barrel
projects that favored the winning coalition and paid little notice to the
public as a whole. This is how foreign aid can actually be very much like a
revenue stream, which usually does not play out well for the public and helps
leave an unresponsive government in power.
Economic
reform can become a crucial tipping point for many regimes receiving foreign
aid that leads to political change. As stated above, foreign aid revenue
streams are basically interchangeable with resource rents. So, just as revenue
streams from resources can be cut off when commodity prices dip, so too can
foreign aid be cut off due to a multitude of reasons. If globalists were in
power in the donor country, and then regionalists come to power, the donor
country can start to demand economic reform in the recipient country in
exchange for aid. Whereas the previous, globalist, donor country was not
requiring any policies, now a new donor change can force a recipient government
to start making economic reforms. The regime receiving aid has a tough
decisions to make, it can either make the changes called for, which may result
in political opposition, or face the loss of revenue from foreign aid, which
also makes it harder for the leader to continue keeping his winning coalition
happy. The reforms may include, devaluation of the currency or privatization of
businesses controlled by the state. Both situations result in a loss of control
over the economy by the government. Devaluation results in a loss of purchasing
power for the winning coalition, which can be especially harsh if the winning
coalition is in an urban area. This means ending the monopsony marketing boards
that were keeping farm prices artificially low to allow urban citizens
increased purchasing power. Once the winning coalition, or the public in
general begins to feel the loss of purchasing power they will turn on the
regime. Furthermore, privatization of business weaken the grip that a dictator
has over the economy and therefore the leader loses another way he could have
manipulated the economy to favor the winning coalition. In the end, a loss of revenue
from foreign aid can spell disaster for many regimes that were coercing and
coopting their citizens while benefiting the winning coalition with that
revenue stream.
Lastly, if
the policy changes become political, it may result in a trend toward democratization.
Although for westerners this sounds like a good idea, it actually has large
risks associated with the process. Put another way, “during the initial phase
of a democratic transition, states face a heightened risk of civil war. When
authoritarian regimes break down, a panoply of elite factions and popular
groups jockey for power in a setting in which repressive state authority has
been weakened, yet democratic institutions are insufficiently developed to take
their place” (Mansfield & Snyder 2008). Essentially, whether due to the
economic reforms being put in place or whatever else is causing internal
pressure, a move towards democracy in a previously authoritarian country is susceptible
to conflict. Furthermore, if an authoritarian leader sees a democratic
transition coming, he may appeal to nationalist or populist motives, which can
be drive people within the country against each other. For instance, pitting
urban workers against the rural farmers can lead to massive support from one
side or the other, but there is also an increased chance of conflict as a
result. Mansfield and Snyder find that, “incompletely democratizing countries
are more than twice as likely to become embroiled in a civil war as a stable
regime…” (Mansfield & Snyder 2008). In the end, this can be for a variety
of reasons, whether because groups jockeying for power attest to ethnic,
populist, nationalist, or sectarian roots to gather support, conflict can
likely erupt over the struggle for power due to the weak institutions inherent
in a democratizing country.
To conclude,
the politics of foreign aid are vast and have far reaching implications for the
regime of recipient countries and for the people of those recipient countries.
Aid is given for a variety of reasons, depending on the goals of the donor
country and the type of policy initiative being undertaken. Ultimately, once it
is known how aid can affect different regimes, and what policy changes entail
for the recipient country, foreign aid can be better tooled and become more
effective in its aims.
References
Bueno de Mesquita, B., &
Smith, A. (2011). The dictator's handbook: Why bad behavior is almost
always good politics. New York: Public Affairs.
Mansfield, Edward., & Synder,
Jack (2008). Democratization and War.
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