- A paper I wrote in the Fall of 2013
Reasons for War
War.
States have gone to war countless times over the history of the modern
international system, and well before this system existed. A Prussian military
theorist, Carl von Clausewitz who lived in through the Napoleonic Wars, once declared,
“War is nothing but the continuation of policy by other means” (Clausewitz). The Correlates of War has a
typology of war that looks at the state within the international system.
Focusing on interstate war, meaning war between formally recognized states; one
can find many factors that influence a country towards war. Of course, there is no single set of
variables that initiate wars between states and therefore one has to look at
many. However, in this essay, we will look at a few variables. In particular, this
paper will examine Vasquez’s key factors relating to the onset of war,
including, territorial disputes, rivalry, arms races, and relative capabilities
among major powers.
To start, territorial
disputes can be a major cause of war among states. In fact, a majority of wars
that are fought are preceded by some sort of territorial dispute (Packer Notes
2013(a)). When one talks of
territorial disputes, it is only logical that a large number of disagreements
occur between neighbors with shared borders. Indeed, between 1816-1980,
excluding imperial wars, every interstate war was fought between neighbors
(Small and Singer, 1982). Rival territorial claims between neighbors can lead
to war, with unclear defined borders being a source of dispute. Though, it is
said that since 1945 territory is less of a cause for conflict, territory still
revokes sentiments of national pride and prestige (Holsti 1991). Perhaps
because borders are now clearly defined in a large part of the world and
therefore there is less disagreement among states over territory. However there
are still wars fought over territory. One such example, after 1945 was the
Falklands War between Britain and Argentina fought over the Falkland Islands. The
two countries fought over a piece of territory, which evoked a lot of
nationalism and pride within both countries. In conclusion, territory is
something that can be a source of disagreement between states in the
international system. Territorial disputes can also form rivalries due to
prolonged disagreement, as we will look at soon.
Rivalries exist all over the world, in many
facets of life, however they also exist between states in the international
system. In the interstate system, it is understood that these rivalries can
have an effect on the propensity for a state to go to war. Rivals can be
defined as, “a competitive relationship between two actors over an issue that
is of the highest salience to them” (Vasquez 1993). These rivals have sustained
mutually contingent hostile interaction with each other (Packer Notes (a)). The data shows that rivals have a greater tendency
to go to war, with further study leading to the finding that of principle
rivalries, three fourths of all wars were linked to rivalries (Vasquez 2012).
Furthermore, a rivalry can break out over a territorial dispute between two
countries. If neighbors have a disagreement about a certain piece of land, it
can become a longer lasting disagreement. A long term rivalry can form between
the two bordering countries over a contested territory or border. That being
said, enduring rivalries also have an effect on the probability of war, Vasquez
shares, “war among states involved in an enduring rivalry is comparatively
high… which means they are almost four times as likely to have a war than
states that have only one or two disputes (Vasquez 2012). This can be further exemplified
in domestic politics of two rival countries trying to cooperate. When one side
cooperates but the other does not, the country that tried to cooperate and
didn’t receive reciprocation is caught with the sucker’s payoff. We know that
neither country wants the sucker’s payoff, and when two countries are
negotiating, the one that doesn’t arm can get the suckers payoff (Packer
Lecture 2013). So, if country A & B are rivals, they are both less likely
to cooperate because if one gets the suckers payoff, for instance say A does,
then there is a good chance the leader of A will lose domestic support of
his/her own people. Therefore, cooperation is risky for leaders of rival
countries, and rivalries can add to that risk because domestic opposition will
surely hold the leader accountable if they end up with the sucker’s payoff at
the rival’s expense. This demonstrates how difficult it can be to cooperate and
mediate disputes between rivals, and so it can lead to war. Lastly, rivalry can
take the form of a power struggle between two states; an idea that Realists
mostly. However, this brings us into the discussion of relative capabilities
factor associated with the onset of war.
Arms
races can occur between two states that may not even have the intention of initially
starting one. This occurs because when one state tries to improve its
capabilities, even if in a defensive way, another state sees that as a loss in
relative capability for itself. Therefore, that state now has to improve its
own capabilities in response. This leads to a spiral theory, an action reaction
process that ends up in an arms race. Due to the fact that A tried to enhance
its security, B feels less secure. This can lead to a higher probability of war
because once the spiral starts and arms race, it can be hard to stop.
Major powers have a lot more interests at stake
in the international system than minor powers. When speaking of relative
capabilities among these major powers, there are two schools of thought. One is
the parity school, which argues that a balance of power is necessary to keep
peace within the international system, and that upsetting the balance of power
can cause war. Due to the relative balance of power among the major states in
the system, it becomes unclear who would win a war. There is so called
“structural ambiguity” that results in peace within the system (Packer Notes
2013(b)). Balance of power theory
leads to the assumption that there are two ways for states to balance out the
system, “external balancing” and “internal balancing”. Internal balancing occurs
when the state builds up forces internally, mobilizing military power and
building economic and industrial strength (Levy and Thompson 2010). This can
also lead to an arms race, as stated earlier, when one country improves
security, it is viewed as a loss of security for another country which then
sees the need to improve its own security. Conversely, external balancing
occurs when states form counterbalancing alliances against an aggressor state
or with the aim to deter a potential aggressor. External balancing and
alliances have an impact on war, especially when taking into account whether
the alliance is made up of satisfied or dissatisfied countries. Dissatisfied
powers are more likely to go to war, because they would rather go to war than
continue the status quo. However, satisfied powers are benefiting from the
status quo and would like to see it continue. This leads to assumptions, for
instance if any one state threatens to gain hegemony then other states will form
a balancing coalition against it. In that way, balance of power theorists claim
that hegemons rarely form. On the other hand, the preponderance school
maintains that there is anarchy without a hegemon. A Hegemon is a country with
such large capabilities relative to all others that it can shoulder the cost of
collective goods. This state is willing to carry the costs by providing
collective security and maintaining order within the international system,
allowing free riders to benefit at the expense of keeping the status quo. So,
in the opposing view, when one state has a large advantage in relative
capabilities, it is able to deter any would be revisionists to the system,
thereby keeping the status quo in check. There is no lack of information as to
who would win a war, because the hegemon has such a large advantage in relative
capabilities. This leads to power transitions within the international system
that can occur when a country starts to gain enough capabilities to possibly
challenge the status quo. Again, it is also important to understand whether the
challenger is satisfied or dissatisfied with the current system. If they are
dissatisfied, then they are more likely to go to war to change the system to
their favor, so-called “revisionists”. Say for instance, country A has more
relative capability than country B, but country A is slowly growing or
stagnating while country B is growing faster so that country B will surpass
country A in capabilities at some point in the future. The defender, country A,
does not know whether the challenger is satisfied or dissatisfied with the
system. Therefore, country A has an incentive to launch a strike, a preventive
war against country B so as to protect itself before B can catch up in relative
capabilities. So a power transition between hegemons, can lead to conflict
between the two states involved, the defender and the challenger. Put another
way, “faced with a rising adversary, especially a potentially hostile one, a
state may be tempted to fight now, when it is stronger, rather than later, when
conditions are less favorable” (Levy and Thompson 2010). Again, this all
depends on whether the challenger feels satisfied with the system, many argue
that the power transition between the USA and the United Kingdom was peaceful
because the USA was satisfied with the international system. Conversely, the
transition between the UK and Germany at the start of the 20th
century can be viewed as a cause of WW1 according to preponderance theorists
because Germany is not viewed as having been satisfied. So, a power transition
does not always have to lead to war. However, when the challenger is
dissatisfied, there is a much greater chance of war because they prefer going
to war over the status quo. In this way, both the parity school and the
preponderance school have differing opinions on what system perpetuates peace
and when there is a tendency for war within the system. In the balance of power
argument, if a state tries to upset the “balance of power” system in place, it
will be counterbalanced against by the status quo.
Ultimately, there are many factors that
influence and affect a state’s propensity for war. Both domestic politics as
well as the international system play a part as leaders face pressures and
signals from both. Focusing on territorial disputes, arms races, rivalry, as
well as relative capabilities among states, one is able to ascertain when
states may be more likely to go to war. Taking it all into account, the study
of war is complex and tough to navigate through all the factors, as each
situation has a multifaceted approach for all actors involved.
References
Clausewitz, Carl Von . On War. Princeton University Press, 1832. Print.
Holsti, Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order, 1648-1989 (1991): 306-334
Levy, Jack, and William Thompson. Causes of War. West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010. Print.
Packer Lecture. September 6, 2013
Packer Notes. War Typology. 2013. (a)
Packer Notes. Parity v. Preponderance. 2013 (b)
Small, M., & David, S. (1982). Resort to arms: International and civil wars, 1816-1980.
Vasquez. The War Puzzle. 1993
Vasquez. What do we know about War? New York, 2012.