A paper I wrote for school: December 16, 2013
Examining Offense-Defense Theory
The
study of war is an important and consequential undertaking that can help us understand how and why conflicts arise. Offense-Defense theory specifically looks at the probability of war related to the dominance of the offense or
defense in terms of a state's military capabilities. It hypothesizes that a world
with a perceived offense dominance leads to a greatly likelihood of war. When offense is dominant, states have a powerful incentive to be the first to strike an opponent. A lack of information amongst actors in the international system, misperceptions
and understanding about capabilities can falsely lead states down a path to a war they
otherwise may not have entered. Moreover, a power shift between a declining and
rising state can create a window of time between the two and create an
increased likelihood of war during that time-frame. Lastly, false optimism and a
states perception about the cost of war can greatly increase or decrease the probability of war occurring. Offense-defense theory can be used to understand conflict in the realm
of international politics. Starting with offense dominance and ending with
false optimism, I will examine each of the arguments in turn and take a look at how
offense dominance increases the vulnerabilities of the security dilemma.
Offense
dominance theory focuses on the military dominance of the offense or defense
during a certain period of time. The fact that offense is dominant can be real
or perceived, however, it still has the same profound implications regarding
the onset of conflict. Offense dominance implies that conquest of another
country will be relatively easy and others are vulnerable to being attacked. Put
another way, “offense-defense balance [can be defined] in terms of the ease of
taking territory compared with the ease of holding territory when attacked”
(Jervis 1978). Knowing this, war becomes more likely in a world that believes
offense is more dominant on the battlefield. A number of factors lead to this
conclusion, among them that states that view offense as dominant are less
likely to use diplomatic means, negotiate, or act cooperatively with other
states (Van Evera 2013:121). This creates an environment where disputes are not
likely to be resolved through diplomatic channels and are therefore more likely
to be decided in a military engagement. Also, states will behave more secretly
about defenses and foreign policy, creating a situation in which there is even
less information available. States become even more secretive because any
information that the enemy can gain about its capabilities is harmful to its
security. The secrecy caused by the outcome of less diplomacy and less
communication brings even more miscalculations and mistrust amongst states. This
fear and insecurity that offense dominance creates within states leads to an
increased likelihood of expansion in order for the states to feel more secure
and to resist other actors expanding very aggressively (Van Evera 2013:119). A
state may feel it necessary to try to expand its borders to a more defensive
perimeter that is easier to defense in order to feel more secure. Furthermore,
offense dominance means that the first side to mobilize or attack first will
have a greater advantage, a perceived first strike advantage, which greatly
increases the incentive for a state to strike first. States feel that if they
do not strike first they are giving up a huge advantage that can be fatal to
any war that may break out. It can also lead to wars that neither side actually
intended on, but due to a lack of information and the first strike advantage
can occur… “Even if a state does not see starting a war as beneficial, it might
suspect that an opponent, basing its calculus on the idea that a first strike
might increase its chances of victory, would be tempted to strike first” (Maoz
1990). Often, this can lead to conflict spirals between states that cannot
determine the intentions of the each other. A conflict spiral is explained
further, “when offense has the advantage… arms races will be intense because
when one country adds forces, its adversary will have to make a larger addition
to restore its ability to defend” (Glaser 1997). So, each side is fearful of
the other side attacking and adds to its capabilities to one up the other side,
attempting to feel more secure. In other words, “insecurity and fear intensify
as an arms race develops until finally it spirals out of control and some
incident touches off a war no one really wanted but that all felt powerless to
prevent” (Lamb 1988). Ultimately, due to a lack of information coupled with a
state’s fear of security there is an increased probability of a dispute turning
into a conflict spiral because of the security dilemma. In this way, an
international environment in which offense has a advantage greater relative to
defense, there is an increased likelihood of war. States have every incentive
to work in secrecy, not engage in diplomacy, and strike first in a conflict. In
this way, offense advantage worsens the vulnerabilities of the conflict spiral.
Power
transitions and the window logic that can accompany these shifts become
heightened by an offense dominance world by increasing the incentive of a preventive
war. A power transition occurs when a rising state and a powerful declining
state start having their relative capabilities on a collision course, the
rising state increasing and the declining state losing capabilities. The
important thing to focus on during a power transition is on whether or not the
rising power is satisfied or dissatisfied with the status quo. Another point, if the
transition happens to occur rapidly, the dominant power may not have enough time to make
enough concessions to satisfy the challenger (Packer Notes 2013). In a world of
offense dominance, the risk of conflict during a transition increases due to the notion of a first strike advantage. The declining state cannot be
sure about the intentions of the rising state, whether the rising state has limited
aims or is trying to change the status quo. Therefore, the declining state
faces a major choice. It has a great incentive to launch preventive war, which
means it would choose to fight now before the state loses even more relative
capabilities to the rising power (Packer Notes 2013). Due to the nature of a
first strike advantage, the declining state may feel forced into a preventive
war because it can never be truly sure of the intentions of the rising state,
and the rising power will eventually have more capabilities than the declining
state if it waits to strike. The longer the declining state waits to strike,
the more disadvantaged it becomes if a war is to break out. This line of
thinking creates windows of opportunity, or window logic, a time frame when a
breakout of war in a power transition is more likely. The thought of a
preventive war can be dated all the back to the Peloponnesian War, a simple thought
of, “we must fight before we are weaker” (Van Evera, 2013; 76). The basic
theory behind window logic is that a declining state in a power transition has
a certain window of time that it can attack the rising power before the rising
power becomes too strong or is able to launch its own strike. Therefore, the
declining state adopts much more risky policies and the chance of a conflict
breaking out during the window is heightened. A current real world example of the idea is Iran’s pursuit of a nuclear weapon. The window of opportunity is the finite time that Israel
has to strike those facilities before it becomes unfeaseable. As Iran inches closer to
nuclear proliferation, the window begins to tighten and Israel may become more
reckless or have an increased probability to strike. The approaching deadline of a nuclear power Iran may force Israel's hand in a short time frame. However, once Iran proliferates,
the window closes and Israel would be hard tested to strike another nuclear power, and both sides understand this notion. Diplomacy may also takes a hit
during a window of opportunity because windows lower the credibility of threats and offers. A
declining state can never be sure if the rising state will keep its word once
the rising state is in a more powerful position, by that time it is too late
for the declining state to win a war. In other words, “declining powers cannot
trust rising powers offers, because rising powers know the declining power
cannot enforce the agreement later” (Van Evera, 2013; 80). This line of
thinking leads one to believe that under the conditions of a power transition
as well as an offense dominated world, there is going to be an increased likelihood of war.
Another
argument that can lead to an onset of war that otherwise may not occur is the
idea of false optimism, that is leaders of a state falsely believing that they
will win the war, or underestimating the cost of war. Let us start with a state
that falsely believes they will win the war. This belief will cause states to
be bolder when a crisis occurs and more likely to consider their adversary to
be bluffing. A lack of information is crucial to this argument because when
both sides have a misperception about the relative capabilities, the likelihood
of war in order for the sides to prove they are right is more likely when
neither knows for sure who is the strongest. Put another way, “If states agree
on their relative power, this test is unnecessary; but if they disagree, a
contest of arms can offer the only way to persuade the weaker side that it is
the weaker and must concede” (Van Evera, 2013:15). Ultimately, it is impossible
for a leader to correctly judge relative capabilities and the definitive test
is war. When states misjudge the capabilities of their opponent or whether they
believe the opponent will give in or is bluffing, leads to a greater likelihood
of war. This is especially true if the common perception is that there is an
offense-advantage in striking first, which leads states to believe that war can
be over quickly. If the war is quicker, the war is presumed to be less costly
and thus more feasible for a state to partake in. A government will shy away
from wars that it believes will be costly but more likely to engage in a
conflict that it believes will be quick and easy to win. Van Evera provides
multiple examples of a false belief in a quick war, one of which being World
War One, when Germany expected to crush France in four weeks and “finish off
the rest of the Triple Entente in four months” (Van Evera, 2013:19). However,
this can also work in the opposite way if a state is overly worried about
defeat. As we stated about offense dominance and the security dilemma, if one
state enhances its capabilities another state may feel threatened by this
action. This false fear of defeat can lead states, “to launch a preemptive
attack if they think they can avert defeat only by striking first, or to launch
a preventive war if they think they can avert later defeat only by striking at
the peak of their power” (Van Evera, 2013;15). Ultimately, false optimism and
false fears of defeat are both likely to increase the chance of conflict
between states. Under these conditions, states make miscalculations and falsely
believe that they can win a war quick and effectively, leading to bold decision
making and ultimately more conflict.
In
conclusion, offense-defense theory offers some interesting insight into why
some conflicts occur and why some states may go to war when neither side
actually wants war in the first place. Overall, it is important to keep the
security dilemma in mind when understanding offense-defense theory because
states may feel less secure when another state increases its capabilities.
Offense dominance creates an environment that may worsen the security dilemma
by having incentives that reward secrecy, first strike advantages, and create
windows under which states must act. War
becomes much more likely when there is an environment of offense dominance,
exacerbating many factors that contribute to conflict.
References
Glaser, C. L. (1997). The
security dilemma revisited. World Politics, 50,
171-201.
Jervis, R. (1978).
Cooperation under the security dilemma. World politics,30(02),
167-214.
Lamb, C. (1988). How
to think about arms control, disarmament, and defense. Prentice Hall.
Maoz, Z. (1990). Paradoxes
of war: On the art of national self-entrapment (p. 66). Boston: Unwin
Hyman.
Packer Notes. Offense-Defense. 2013.
Van Evera, S. (2013). Causes
of war: Power and the roots of conflict. Cornell University Press.
